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Abstract
Background
Visual mental imagery might be critical in the ability to discriminate imagined from perceived
pictures. Our aim was to investigate the neural bases of this specific type of reality-monitor-
ing process in individuals with high visual imagery abilities.
Methods
A reality-monitoring task was administered to twenty-six healthy participants using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging. During the encoding phase, 45 words designating com-
mon items, and 45 pictures of other common items, were presented in random order. During
the recall phase, participants were required to remember whether a picture of the item had
been presented, or only a word. Two subgroups of participants with a propensity for high vs.
low visual imagery were contrasted.
Results
Activation of the amygdala, left inferior occipital gyrus, insula, and precuneus were observed
when high visual imagers encoded words later remembered as pictures. At the recall phase,
these same participants activated the middle frontal gyrus and inferior and superior parietal
lobes when erroneously remembering pictures.
Conclusions
The formation of visual mental images might activate visual brain areas as well as structures
involved in emotional processing. High visual imagers demonstrate increased activation of a
fronto-parietal source-monitoring network that enables distinction between imagined and
perceived pictures.
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Introduction
Source monitoring refers to the ability to remember the origin of information. One type of
source-monitoring process, referred to as ‘reality-monitoring’, ensures that the memories for
perceived events are distinguished from those for imagined events. Such distinction can nor-
mally be achieved by assessing the context of the information: perceived information contains
more sensory details, while imagined information has details about the cognitive operations
executed during its formation [1]. Visual mental imagery might be critical in this distinction
[2].
Reality-monitoring failure appears to be involved in hallucinations [3] and can occur in any
modality. More particularly, failure to discriminate between imagined and perceived pictures
might be involved in visual hallucinations [4]. Visual imagery and visual perception might
have common neural substrates in healthy people as well as in people with visual hallucina-
tions. Several groups have reported that visual imagery activates the same cortical regions as
those involved in visual perception. Daselaar et al. [5] and Oertel et al. [6] observed activation
in the lateral occipital complex (LOC) during visual imagery and visual hallucinations respec-
tively, and the same area was also activated during visual perception in Daselaar et al. [5]. The
lateral occipital complex is notably important for object perception [7,8]. In their review of
neuroimaging studies of visual imagery, Kosslyn and Thompson [9] reported that the primary
visual cortex (striate and calcarine cortex) was involved in visual imagery. On the other hand,
certain studies have observed brain activity specific to either visual imagery or visual percep-
tion. Daselaar et al. [5] reported that the right superior parietal lobe was specifically involved
in visual imagery. Ganis and colleagues [10] observed activity in the parietal cortex (especially
the superior parietal lobule and the precuneus) and the prefrontal cortex during visual imagery
and visual perception tasks, but the occipital cortex (inferior and right superior occipital
gyrus) was engaged only during perception. The frontal and parietal regions appear to be
involved in numerous types of cognitive control processes [11,12]. Visual imagery might
engage brain areas involved in visual perception as well as those involved in cognitive control.
The neural mechanisms underlying false memories for pictures have been investigated at
both the production (visual imagery) and retrieval (reality-monitoring judgment) phases.
Gonsalves et al. [13] used a visual imagery task in which participants were asked to generate
visual images on the basis of presented words. Pictures were presented as well. Participants
were subsequently required to distinguish the pictures they had really seen from those they
had imagined. The authors reported that, when processing the words that were later errone-
ously recalled as pictures, the participants activated the precuneus, right inferior parietal cor-
tex, and anterior cingulate. Kensinger and Schacter [14] used a similar paradigm and found
different areas to be engaged in these errors: the fusiform and parahippocampal gyri. Other
studies have focused on the brain areas involved in the retrieval processes, i.e., the decision as
to whether a picture has actually been presented or only imagined. Okado and Stark [15]
found increased activation of the anterior cingulate gyrus during the false memories of pic-
tures, while the parahippocampal gyrus and the occipital lobe were activated during the correct
remembering of presented pictures. Kensinger and Schacter [16] reported that the left middle
frontal gyrus was involved in the misattribution of items to pictorial presentation.
Although many studies have explored the misattribution of imagined pictures to percep-
tion, no functional neuroimaging study, as far as we know, has investigated proneness to visual
imagery in relation to these errors. Visual imagery proneness might be critical in the false
remembering of non-presented pictures. However, most studies explicitly requested the partic-
ipants to generate visual mental images of the items, and therefore spontaneous visual imagery
was not assessed.
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Our objective was to determine, in healthy individuals prone to visual imagery, the neural
bases of the confusion between spontaneously imagined pictures and perceived pictures, a
mechanism that could be crucial in the formation of visual hallucinations. Pictures of common
items mixed with the mere verbal labels of others were presented to participants, who were
subsequently required to remember whether they had seen a picture of the item or only its ver-
bal label. Cortical activity associated with both the processing and the recall of the verbal labels
erroneously remembered as pictures was examined. A subgroup of participants with high and
another with low visual imagery abilities were identified on the basis of a new scale specifically
designed for this study. Although standard questionnaires of visual imagery are available, we
created a tool thought to assess the spontaneous production of visual mental imagery rather
than its vividness. People with high visual imagery were expected to activate vision-related
brain areas when processing these verbal labels, suggesting that they had made a mental image
of the item. Such brain areas may include the lingual gyrus, the middle occipital gyrus, or the
fusiform girus, which have all been found to be involved in the viewing of pictures [17]. Addi-
tional activation of non-visual brain areas would suggest that these areas are involved in the
process of forming a visual mental image. In the recall phase, people with high visual imagery
were expected to activate brain areas related to source- monitoring judgment. These brain
areas might include the anterior cingulate gyrus and the left middle frontal gyrus, as suggested
by the above-mentioned studies of false remembering of imagined pictures. Propensity to
non-clinical hallucinations and delusions was also assessed in order to examine the specificity
of the alleged associations between visual imagery proneness and brain activity. Indeed, clini-
cal and non-clinical psychotic experiences have been associated with reality-monitoring fail-
ure, and they may also be associated with visual imagery [18,19]. We set out to determine
whether the brain activity observed in participants with high visual imagery proneness was
similarly observed in participants with high hallucination and/or delusion proneness.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-six healthy participants (10 female) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were
recruited from the general population by means of announcements: age: mean = 37.3, sd = 9.1;
education level: mean = 5.9 (the scale used was: 1 = no studies; 2 = uncompleted primary stud-
ies; 3 = completed primary studies; 4 = high school uncompleted; 5 = high school completed;
6 = undergraduate studies; 7 = bachelor’s or master’s degree; 8 = doctorate); verbal IQ:
mean = 24.2, sd = 5.0 (verbal IQ was assessed by means of the Acentuación de Palabras test; the
equivalent standardized verbal IQ for 24.2 is 104 [20]). The inclusion criteria were age between
18 and 60 years, and fluency in Spanish. The exclusion criteria were neurological or mental ill-
ness, intellectual disability, head injury, alcohol or drug abuse in the past six months, and cur-
rent severe physical disease, as well as the standard exclusion criteria for participation in fMRI
procedures, namely claustrophobia and metallic implants including fitted pacemaker and
cochlear implants. This study was approved by the Parc Sanitari Sant Joan de De´u ethics com-
mittee and all participants provided written informed consent before taking part in the study.
Scales for visual imagery, hallucinations and delusion proneness
Proneness to hallucinations was assessed by means of a Spanish adaptation of the Launay-
Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS; [21]), a self-questionnaire which assesses non-clinical hallu-
cinations within various modalities. Two additional items were mixed with the LSHS items,
although not taken into account in the computation of the global LSHS score: ‘I can easily iden-
tify animals or things in the clouds’, and ‘When I see spots (of painting, humidity. . .), I can see
Visual Imagery and False Memories
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faces, silhouettes or objects in them’. These two items were first piloted in the general population
to ensure that they led to a diversity of scores. Similar to the LSHS items, each of these new
items had to be rated from 0 to 3 by the participants according to the frequency of the experi-
ence. The extended LSHS scale including the two new items was validated in a Spanish sample
of 210 non-clinical individuals, and the two added items demonstrated a satisfactory internal
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .82; Sara Siddi, personal communication). The total score
obtained on these two items constituted a visual imagery score (m = 1.77, sd = .95; range: 0–3)
and was used to define two subgroups: nine participants who obtained a visual imagery score
of 0 or 1 were included in the low visual imagery subgroup (mean score: m = .67), although
one of them had to be subsequently ruled out of the encoding (but not of the recall) analyses
due to unreliable fMRI data; and seven participants who scored at least 2 on either of the two
questions were included in the high visual imagery subgroup (mean score: m = 2.86). The two
subgroups were highly significantly different with regard to the visual imagery score (t(14) =
9.62, p<.0001). The remaining ten participants, who obtained a visual imagery score of 2 by
scoring 1 on each of the two questions, were excluded from the analyses involving visual imag-
ery score because it was unclear whether they should be included in the high or the low visual
imagery subgroup.
A global hallucination proneness score was tallied by adding up the sub-scores for all LSHS
items (excluding the two new items) (m = 4.5, sd = 3.2; range: 0–11). Subgroups of participants
with high (score 6, n = 8 for encoding and n = 7 for recall) and low (score 2, n = 8 for
encoding and n = 7 for recall) global hallucination proneness score were defined. Ten partici-
pants with a score of 3, 4, or 5 were excluded from the analyses contrasting these subgroups.
Auditory non-verbal and verbal hallucination proneness scores were computed as well by add-
ing up the sub-scores obtained on the corresponding items. Proneness to delusions was
assessed by means of the Peters Delusion Inventory scale [22] (m = 4.7, sd = 4.5; range: 0–21).
Subgroups of participants with high (score > = 6, n = 11 for encoding and n = 10 for recall)
and low (score< = 2, n = 9 for encoding and for recall) delusion proneness score were defined.
Five participants who scored 3, 4, or 5 were excluded from these subgroup comparisons. Cer-
tain fMRI data had to be discarded due to technical problems (see below).
Material
Ninety items were selected, including 72 common objects (saw, apron, envelope. . .) and 18
vegetables (carrot, cauliflower, onion. . .). Participants were presented with either the mere ver-
bal label of the item or the picture of the item along with its verbal label. Half of the items were
presented as single words and the other half as word/picture pairs. Two versions of the stimuli
were prepared; the 45 stimuli that were presented as words in one version were presented as
word/picture pairs in the other. The use of each version was counterbalanced among subjects.
All material was presented to participants throughout via Presentation (http://www.neurobs.
com/). Before both the encoding and the recall phases, participants were administered a few
practice trials to ensure familiarity with the task.
Procedure
Encoding. All items were presented one by one in pseudo-random order with each slide
(word or word/picture pair) being presented for 3.5 seconds, separated by fixation crosses.
The stimulus onset asynchrony varied across trials from 5.5 to 9 seconds according to an expo-
nential distribution with a mean of 6.68 seconds. This stimulus onset asynchrony distribution
was used because a pilot study had indicated that it resulted in reliable activation patterns and
was optimal in terms of total task duration. The encoding of the items was implicit since the
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task was described as a classification task: participants were required to indicate whether the
presented items were vegetables or not, and to give their response by pressing one of two but-
tons (‘vegetable’ or ‘other’). They were not informed of the subsequent recall task. The com-
puter recorded correct and incorrect responses, as well as misses (i.e., no response after 2
seconds from the end of the stimulus).
Recall. A 6-minute delay followed, during which a structural MRI scan was acquired for
each participant. Then the participants were informed that they would be presented with all
the labels of the stimuli they had previously seen, and that they would have to remember
whether a picture accompanied the item at the encoding phase. The labels were presented one
at a time for a 3.5-second period, in pseudo-random order different from that used in the
encoding stage, but with similar stimulus onset asynchrony distribution. After the appearance
of each label the participants were asked to provide their response by pressing one of two but-
tons (‘with picture’ or ‘without picture’). The correct responses, i.e., presented words remem-
bered as words (WW) and presented pictures remembered as pictures (PP), were recorded, as
were the incorrect responses: the omissions, i.e. presented pictures remembered as words
(PW) and the false memories of pictures, i.e. presented words remembered as pictures (WP).
Again, missed trials were recorded.
The response times for each type of response were recorded as well. Prior to the experimen-
tal protocol participants were provided with an opportunity to ask any questions they had.
fMRI data acquisition
Functional MRI data were acquired with a 1.5T General Electric Signa HDe scanner at Parc
Sanitari Sant Joan de De´u. A T2-weighted functional echoplanar imaging sequence depicting
BOLD contrast was obtained using a quadrature head coil. In total 270 volumes were collected
with slices parallel to the AC-PC plane, resulting in an axial-oblique orientation. The following
scanning parameters were used: 26 interleaved slices, 4 mm thickness, 1 mm gap, TR = 2000
ms, TE = 40 ms, 24 cm FOV, 64 × 64 acquisition matrix, flip angle = 90˚. The first seven vol-
umes in each run were discarded to allow for magnetic saturation effects. Visual stimuli were
presented on a rear projection screen and viewed through a mirror mounted on the head coil,
and all responses were collected with an MR-compatible response box (fORP, Current
Designs, Inc., USA; www.curdes.com).
fMRI data preprocessing
Imaging data were analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
London; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) running under MATLAB (Release 2009a, The Math-
Works, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts). All of the volumes from each participant were spatially
realigned to the first image in each series, in order to correct for small head movements and to
generate a mean image for the functional series. Motion parameters were examined for each
subject to ensure no movements larger than the voxel size were present (no runs were dis-
carded). The resulting series were transformed into SRI24 space [23], with a standard EPI tem-
plate as deformation target, and then spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-
width-at-half-maximum.
Due to machine errors, data from the encoding task for one participant (from the low imag-
ery subgroup) were disregarded, as were data from the recall task for two other participants
(both among the ten participants excluded from the high- vs. low-imagery subgroups).
Visual Imagery and False Memories
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fMRI data analysis
Preprocessed fMRI data were then analyzed with an event-related model, using SPM8. In
order to assess random effects at the individual level, the activity associated with the experi-
mental conditions was modeled with a hemodynamic response function (HRF). To avoid the
inherent problems of currently available slice-timing correction techniques based on temporal
realignment [24], we controlled slice timing latencies by including the time derivative of the
HRF in the individual model as a nuisance parameter [25]. This method has proven effective
in compensating for slice acquisition delays for TR = 2 s [25,26]. Displacement and rotation
motion parameters were also included as confounds in the individual model. A 200 s high-
pass filter cut-off was used to remove low frequency noise, together with an AR(1) model to
correct for temporal autocorrelation.
For both tasks, four event types were determined by the responses in the recall task: WW,
PP, PW, and WP. To compare each event, linear contrasts were constructed to test experimen-
tal effects of interest. These contrasts were entered into a second level analysis in which sub-
jects were treated as a random effect. One-sample and two- sample t-tests were used to assess
within-group and between-subgroup activations, respectively.
The resulting statistical parametric maps were generated with SPM8, initially using an
uncorrected voxel-level threshold defined by T = 3.0 (p< 0.003) and a cluster extent threshold
defined by a family-wise-error (FWE) corrected p< 0.05. In the event that the resulting activa-
tion clusters encompassed several brain structures, a more restrictive voxel-wise threshold,
T = 3.8–4.0 (p< 0.0004), was applied to better identify local activation maxima in each brain
structure, again followed by a p< 0.05 FWE-corrected threshold on the remaining clusters.
Activation peaks were labeled according to the SRI24/TZO cortical parcellation map [23]
based on the template described by Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. [27].
Results
The number of presented pictures correctly remembered as pictures out of 45 presented pic-
tures was m = 25.4 (sd = 7.4). The number of presented words erroneously remembered as pic-
tures (false memories) out of 45 presented words was m = 9.5 (sd = 6.7). Longer response
times were observed for the false remembering of non-presented pictures than for the correct
remembering of presented pictures (m = 1860 ms, sd = 478 ms vs. m = 1576 ms, sd = 377 ms;
t(25) = 4.43, p<.0001).
We identified neural correlates of the confusion between presented and imagined pictures
with model-based fMRI. Four response types were identified for both the encoding and recall
tasks, according to the responses recorded during recall: presented pictures remembered as
pictures (PP), presented words remembered as words (WW), presented pictures remembered
as words (PW), and presented words remembered as pictures (WP). Missed responses were
not modeled since there were extremely few of them. Verbal IQ and sex were controlled for in
the following fMRI analyses for their potentially confounding effects.
Perception
The neural substrates involved in the perception of words and pictures in the encoding stage
were highlighted with straightforward contrasts of presented pictures (P)> presented words (W),
and presented words (W)> presented pictures (P) (see Table 1, upper section). The presentation
of word/picture pairs activated bilateral fusiform and lingual gyri, as well as the left middle
occipital gyrus. The presentation of words without pictures activated the right supramarginal
gyrus and the right inferior parietal lobe.
Visual Imagery and False Memories
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Encoding
Characteristic brain activity for each trial type during the encoding phase is illustrated in Sup-
porting Information (S1 Fig).
Table 1. Brain activation areas during perception and encoding in 25 participants, after controlling for sex and verbal IQ.
Contrast Cluster size and cluster-level significance
(pFWE, pFDR)
Cluster peak
coordinates*
Region
SRI24 MNI
Perception
P >W (voxel-level pFWE
< 0.05)
338 (0.001, 0.001) -27, -70,
-16
-30, -73,
-6
Fusiform L
639 (0.001, 0.001) 24, -64,
-13
28, -72,
-6
Fusiform R
111 (0.001, 0.001) -3, -85,
-19
-4, -89,
-6
Lingual R / L
73 (0.001, 0.001) -33, -82,
-4
-37, -82,
11
Middle occipital gyrus L
W > P 265 (0.002, 0.002) 57, -49,
32
62, -40,
45
Supramarginal gyrus R
and
45, -52,
44
49, -41,
59
inferior parietal lobe R
Encoding
Correct subsequent memories PP > PW 203 (0.006, 0.006) -39, -64,
-13
-43, -66,
-4
Lateral occipital
complex L
101 (0.107, 0.055) 36, -64,
-13
38, -66,
-3
Lateral occipital
complex R
WW >WP N. S. - - -
WW > PP 261 (0.001, 0.001) 12, 23, 26 13, 32,
20
Anterior cingulate gyrus
R
-6, 23, 32 6, 33, 27 and med. sup. front.
gyrus L
264 (0.001, 0.001) 3, -73, 26 -5, -67,
43
Precuneus R / L
437 (0.001, 0.001) 48, -61, 2 52, -59,
13
Middle temporal gyrus
R,
48, -70,
20
52, -65,
36
and angular R,
39, -52,
35
42, -43,
49
and inferior parietal
lobe R
180 (0.005, 0.003) -63, -34,
-7
-69, -34,
-5
Middle temporal gyrus L
91 (0.099, 0.050) -45, -67,
20
-50, -62,
35
Angular L
False subsequent memories of
pictures
WP >WW N. S. - - -
WP > PP 184 (0.010, 0.010) 57, -49,
29
63, -41,
41
Supramarginal gyrus R
and
36, -67,
41
39, -57,
60
superior parietal lobe R
LOC = lateral occipital complex; SRI24 = SRI24 stereotactic coordinates; MNI = MNI stereotactic coordinates; pFWE = family-wise error corrected p-value;
pFDR = false discovery rate corrected p-value.
* Peak-level corrected significance pFWE <.05 marked in bold coordinates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169551.t001
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Correct subsequent memories. The contrast presented pictures remembered as pictures
(PP)> presented pictures remembered as words (PW), used to study the successful encoding of
pictures, resulted in a bilateral activation of the lateral occipital complex. To study the success-
ful encoding of word-only trials we used the contrast presented words remembered as words
(WW)> presented words remembered as pictures (WP), for which no significant activation was
observed. However, when the contrast presented words remembered as
words (WW)> presented pictures remembered as pictures (PP) was considered, numerous
activations were observed (see Table 1, middle section).
False subsequent memories of pictures. The contrasts WP>WW and WP> PP were
investigated to study the brain activation associated with the encoding of words later errone-
ously remembered as pictures. The contrast WP> PP, used to evaluate whether false subse-
quent memories of non-presented pictures differed from correct subsequent memories of
presented pictures, showed significant activation of the right supramarginal gyrus and right
superior parietal lobe (see Table 1, lower section).
Role of visual imagery in encoding-related brain activation. The visual imagery score
followed normal distribution. It correlated significantly with the auditory hallucination prone-
ness score (r = .45, p<.025) and with the delusion proneness score (ρ = .45, p<.025), and
therefore these two variables were controlled for in the following contrasts.
To study the effect of visual imagery on the encoding of the items, we recomputed the
above contrasts comparing the high (n = 7) and low (n = 8) visual imagery score subgroups by
means of a two-sample t-test, after controlling for sex, verbal IQ, auditory hallucination prone-
ness, and delusion proneness. Results are reported in Table 2. The contrasts for correct
Table 2. Brain activation differences between high (7 participants) and low (8 participants) visual
imagery score subgroups during encoding, after controlling for verbal IQ, sex, auditory hallucination
proneness, and delusion proneness.
Contrast Cluster size and cluster-
level significance (pFWE,
pFDR)
Cluster peak
coordinates*
Region
SRI24 MNI
Correct subsequent
memories (encoding)
PP > PW N. S. - - -
WW >WP N. S. - - -
WW > PP N. S. - - -
False subsequent
memories of pictures
(encoding)
WP >WW
(T > 4.0)
114 (0.002, 0.012) 30, -1,
-13
33, -1,
-19
Amygdala R
94 (0.006, 0.018) -27, -4,
-13
-29,
-4, -19
Amygdala L
60 (0.046, 0.086) -39,
-67, -22
-43,
-71,
-14
Inferior
occipital gyrus
L
WP > PP
(T > 4.0)
61 (0.025, 0.040) -30, -7,
-16
-33,
-8, -21
Amygdala L
76 (0.009, 0.022) 39, -10,
11
42, -5,
11
Insula R
94 (0.003, 0.014) -39,
-70, -25
-43,
-75,
-16
Inferior
occipital gyrus
L
53 (0.043, 0.054) 3, -67, 5 3, -65,
18
Precuneus R /
L
SRI24 = SRI24 stereotactic coordinates; MNI = MNI stereotactic coordinates;
pFWE = family-wise error corrected p-value; pFDR = false discovery rate corrected p-value.
* Peak-level corrected significance pFWE <.05 marked in bold coordinates
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169551.t002
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subsequent memories (PP > PW, WW > WP and WW> PP) did not yield any significant
activation. However, the contrasts for false subsequent memories of pictures (WP> WW and
WP > PP) yielded significant activation in various brain regions, notably the amygdala and
the left inferior occipital gyrus (Fig 1).
To determine the specificity of this observed effect of visual imagery, we contrasted the sub-
jects with high (n = 8) vs. low (n = 8) global hallucination proneness score after controlling for
sex, verbal IQ, visual imagery score, and delusion proneness. The contrasts WP> WW and
WP > PP did not yield any significant activation. Finally, contrasting the high (n = 11) vs. low
(n = 9) delusion proneness scorers after controlling for sex, verbal IQ, visual imagery score,
and auditory hallucination proneness score, did not yield any significant activation either.
Recall
Characteristic brain activity for each trial type during the recall phase is illustrated in Support-
ing Information (S2 Fig).
Analyses were conducted on the recall data in 24 participants, to study brain activations
associated with the remembering of whether a picture of the item was presented at the encod-
ing phase (see Table 3).
Correct memories. The same analyses as those conducted in the encoding data showed
activation only in the contrast presented pictures remembered as pictures > presented pictures
remembered as words (PP > PW). In addition, we included the contrast presented pictures
remembered as pictures > presented words remembered as words (PP > WW), which was not
studied for the encoding phase since it was equivalent to P>W in terms of its effect of interest.
This latter contrast also yielded significant activations.
False memories of pictures. No significant activation was observed for the contrasts
reflecting the false memories of non-presented pictures.
Fig 1. Activation maps consistent with false subsequent remembering of pictures in participants with high visual imagery.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169551.g001
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Role of visual imagery in recall-related brain activation. These contrasts were recom-
puted comparing the high (n = 7) vs. low (n = 9) visual imagery scoring participants. Results
are presented in Table 4. A significant activation of the left precentral and postcentral gyri was
observed for the correct remembering of presented pictures (PP > WW). The false memories
of pictures (WP > WW and WP> PP) led to activations in the left middle frontal gyrus and
the inferior and superior parietal lobes (Fig 2).
To determine the specificity of the effects of visual imagery, we contrasted the subjects with
high (n = 7) vs. low (n = 7) global hallucination proneness score after controlling for sex,
verbal IQ, visual imagery score, and delusion proneness score. No significant activations were
observed for the false memories related contrasts WP> WW and WP > PP. Contrasting the
high (n = 10) vs. low (n = 9) delusion proneness scorers after controlling for sex, verbal IQ,
visual imagery score, and auditory hallucination proneness score did not yield any significant
activation in those contrasts either.
Associations of visual imagery with scores and response times in the recall task.
Finally, we conducted regression analyses on the scores and response times for each type of
response within the 16 participants from the high and low visual imagery subgroups. With
respect to the scores, subgroups (high/low), auditory hallucination proneness score, delusion
proneness score, sex, and verbal IQ were used as predictors. No significant or trend level
association with visual imagery was observed for any of the four scores (number of pictures
Table 3. Brain activation areas during recall in 24 participants, after controlling for sex and verbal IQ.
Contrast Cluster size and cluster-
level significance (pFWE,
pFDR)
Cluster peak
coordinates*
Region
SRI24 MNI
Correct memories
(recall)
PP > PW
(T = 3.90)
91 (0.008, 0.037) -6, -88,
-16
-7,
-91, -1
Calcarine L
+ Lingual L
94 (0.007, 0.037) 6, 11, 2 7, 14,
-5
Caudate R
89 (0.009, 0.037) -9, 2, 8 -10, 6,
4
Caudate L
57 (0.038, 0.094) -6, -79,
23
-7,
-73, 41
Precuneus L
69 (0.022, 0.067) -42,
-67, 35
-46,
-59, 52
Inferior parietal
lobe L and
-39,
-67, 23
-43,
-61, 38
angular gyrus L
PP >WW
(T = 4.00)
369 (0.001, 0.001) -15, -4,
23
-16, 3,
23
Caudate L and
9, -4, 14 10, 2,
13
caudate R
49 (0.021, 0.123) -6, -88,
-16
-7,
-91, -1
Calcarine L
+ Lingual L
WW >WP N. S. - - -
WW > PP N. S. - - -
False memories of
pictures (recall)
WP >WW N. S. - - -
WP > PP N. S. - - -
SRI24 = SRI24 stereotactic coordinates; MNI = MNI stereotactic coordinates;
pFWE = family-wise error corrected p-value; pFDR = false discovery rate corrected p-value.
* Peak-level corrected significance pFWE <.05 marked in bold coordinates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169551.t003
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correctly remembered as pictures, number of pictures remembered as words, number of
words remembered as pictures, and number of words correctly remembered as words). With
respect to the response times, the same predictors were used except that sex was replaced by
age. Visual imagery subgroup membership was significantly associated with the response time
for the false memories of non-presented pictures (see Table 5). Data showed that the 7 partici-
pants with high visual imagery score presented longer response times for these false memories
than did the 9 participants with low visual imagery score (estimated marginal means: 2224 ms
vs. 1596 ms).
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the neurophysiological underpinnings of the for-
mation and subsequent false remembering of imagined pictures in individuals with high visual
imagery abilities. It was expected that the presentation of words designating common items
would facilitate the formation of visual mental images, and therefore the participants would
Table 4. Brain activation differences between high (7 participants) and low (9 participants) visual
imagery score subgroups during recall, after controlling for verbal IQ, sex, auditory hallucination
proneness, and delusion proneness.
Contrast Cluster size and cluster-
level significance (pFWE,
pFDR)
Cluster peak
coordinates*
Region
SRI24 MNI
Correct Memories
(recall)
PP > PW N. S. - - -
PP >WW
(T > 3.8)
104 (0.007, 0.024) -30,
-43, 50
-33,
-31,
64
Precentral gyrus L
and postcentral
gyrus L
WW >WP N. S. - - -
WW > PP N. S. - - -
False memories
of pictures (recall)
WP >WW
(T > 4.0)
199 (0.001, 0.001) -36, 17,
38
-39,
28, 35
Middle frontal gyrus L
197 (0.001, 0.001) -36,
-64, 38
-40,
-55,
55
Inf. parietal lobe L
and
-21,
-70, 38
-23,
-61,
56
sup. parietal lobe L
141 (0.001, 0.001) 30, -61,
29
32,
-53,
44
Inf. parietal lobe R
and
27, -64,
41
29,
-54,
59
sup. parietal lobe R
WP > PP
(T > 4.0)
55 (0.036, 0.081) -36,
-61, 38
-40,
-52,
54
Inf. parietal lobe L
and
-24,
-67, 38
-27,
-58,
56
sup. parietal lobe L
SRI24 = SRI24 stereotactic coordinates; MNI = MNI stereotactic coordinates; pFWE = family-wise error
corrected p-value; pFDR = false discovery rate corrected p-value.
* Peak-level corrected significance pFWE <.05 marked in bold coordinates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169551.t004
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have difficulty discriminating afterwards whether the picture was really perceived before, or
only imagined.
As expected, when processing the words later remembered as pictures, people prone to
visual imagery activated a visual area, namely the left inferior occipital gyrus [28], significantly
more than did the other participants. It should be noted that, in the whole sample, the left
Fig 2. Activation maps consistent with false remembering of pictures in participants with high visual imagery. Brain activity
differences between high- (n = 7) vs. low- (n = 9) visual imagery score subgroups when controlling for verbal IQ, sex, auditory hallucination
proneness, and delusion proneness (see Table 4). Activations are shown over the SRI24 structural template for illustration purposes only. A)
Activation of the left middle frontal gyrus and bilateral activation of the inferior and superior parietal lobes during the false remembering of
non-presented pictures when compared to correct remembering of words presented as words (contrast WP >WW). B) Activation of the left
inferior and superior parietal lobe during the false remembering of non-presented pictures when compared to correct remembering of
presented pictures (contrast WP > PP).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169551.g002
Table 5. Regression analyses of the response time for each type of response in the recall task, in the 16 participants with high (n = 7) and low
(n = 9) visual imagery scores (β coefficients and p values).
Type of response High vs low visual
imagery scorers
Auditory hallucination
proneness
Delusion
proneness
Age Verbal
IQ
R2 F
test
P
value
Correct memories of presented
pictures (PP)
.52 -.55 -.25 -.12 -.56 .52 2.2 ns
Omission of presented pictures
(PW)
.09 -.48* .13 .53* -.26 .82 9.0 .002
False memories of pictures (WP) .83** -.35 -.37 -.25 -.77+ .64 3.5 .05
Correct memories of presented
words (WW)
.07 -.41 -.16 .50 -.18 .74 5.8 .009
+ p = .051,
* p <.05,
** p <.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169551.t005
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middle occipital gyrus was involved in the perception of pictures, and the lateral occipital com-
plex was involved in the effective encoding of these pictures (see Table 1). Activation in visual
areas has been associated with the formation of visual mental images in a number of investiga-
tions [5,6,8]. In their whole sample, Ganis et al. [10] found the inferior occipital area to be
implicated during perception of pictures but not during visual imagery. Taken together, their
results and ours suggest that only people with high visual imagery abilities activate the occipital
gyrus when presented with words designating common objects.
When processing words later erroneously remembered as pictures, people with high visual
imagery abilities also activated the amygdala, the insula and the precuneus significantly more
than did their counterparts with lower imaging abilities. The amygdala and insula have been
found to be involved in emotional processing [29–31]. The insula has also been seen to be
involved in self-reflective processes [32] as well as in visual imagery and perception [10]. As
for the amygdala, it has also been implicated in consolidation and retrieval processes [33].
Ford et al. [34] demonstrated hyperconnectivity between the amygdala and visual cortex in
schizophrenia patients with visual hallucinations, and they argued that this hyperconnectivity
may facilitate activation of emotional visual images. With respect to the precuneus, it has been
found to be implicated in various functions such as visual processing, visuo-spatial imagery,
episodic memory retrieval, and self-processing operations [35,36]. Gonsalves et al. [13]
reported, as did we, that the precuneus was activated when processing words later remembered
as pictures. The activation of these brain areas, namely amygdala, insula, and precuneus, along
with the occipital gyrus, might be responsible for the formation of imagined pictures.
In the subsequent source memory judgment, those individuals with high visual imagery
abilities, when erroneously remembering pictures, showed greater activation in the left middle
frontal gyrus than did the other participants, as well as greater bilateral activation of the infe-
rior and superior parietal lobe. Kim and Cabeza [37] observed that high confidence false recog-
nition of words was similarly associated with fronto-parietal activity, and they interpreted this
activity as reflecting the processing of familiarity. The parietal lobe is associated with declara-
tive memory [38] and source memory [39]. More particularly, it has been associated with false
memories and retrieval of contextual information [15,40–42] as well as with decision making
[43]. As for the middle frontal gyrus, it is generally involved in executive functions [44] and
spatial working memory [45]. In agreement with our data, previous studies found the middle
frontal gyrus to be involved in pictorial misattributions [16] and false recognition of new
words [46]. On retrieval, participants with high visual imagery might attempt to remember the
sensory details associated with the imagined pictures in order to make their decisions. This
effort was also reflected in their increased response time when falsely remembering pictures,
relative to the participants with low visual imagery ability. However, high visual imagery abili-
ties were not associated with increased rates of false memories of pictures. Thus, in these non-
clinical individuals with presumably intact reality-monitoring skills, the visual mental images
formed during word presentation seem to have led mostly to enhanced recruitment of reality-
monitoring resources on memory test in order to resolve the conflict between imagined and
perceived pictures. It is important to note that the effects observed are specific to individuals
prone to visual imagery, since no differential brain activity was observed in individuals prone
to either hallucinations or delusions.
The main limitation of our study is that only small subgroups of participants were involved
in the comparisons of high- vs. low-imagers, thereby reducing the reliability of the fMRI analy-
ses. A sample of seven individuals with high visual imagery abilities is clearly insufficient to
allow conclusions to be drawn on the role of visual imagery in reality monitoring processes.
Moreover, due to the constraints of the fMRI procedure, the main measure of interest–false
memories of pictures–relied on a limited number of observations. Further studies are
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definitively warranted to confirm the effects observed in our data. Indeed, we cannot rule out
the possibility that these effects emerged merely by chance. Alternatively, though, the fact that
significant differential brain activity between high- and low-imagers was recorded during both
encoding and recall phases under these experimental conditions might mean that the effects
are robust enough to break through in spite of limited power.
Another important limitation is that the propensity to visual imagery, which is central to
the hypotheses, was assessed by means of a novel scale with a restrictive range. It would have
been of interest to use a standard instrument such as the Vividness of Visual Imagery Ques-
tionnaire [47] along with our own and then compare the performance of both. However, what
we sought to capture in this study was the spontaneity and abundance of visual imagery rather
than its vividness, and our visual imagery scale appears to have been effective enough for that
purpose. Indeed, it enabled us to identify a subgroup of individuals with high propensity to
generating visual mental images as reflected by their differential activation of a visual area dur-
ing word encoding. It should be noted, nonetheless, that our sample as a whole presented
lower than average propensity to visual imagery, as demonstrated retrospectively by a valida-
tion study of the two items designed to investigate this dimension (visual score: m = 1.77,
range: 0–3 in our whole sample vs. m = 2.33, range: 0–6 in 210 participants from the general
population; Sara Siddi, personal communication). More striking results would probably have
emerged if participants more strongly inclined to visual imagery had been included. An addi-
tional limitation is that our visual imagery score only reflected subjective ratings of partici-
pants’ visual imagery abilities. Different results might have been obtained with an objective
measure of visual imagery.
Considering the small size of the sample and the use of a single restricted measure of visual
imagery, our findings must be considered as preliminary. The results need to be replicated in
larger samples, and using a more extensive assessment of objective and subjective visual imag-
ery. In spite of these limitations, our data suggest that brain regions allegedly involved in emo-
tional, self-reflective, and retrieval processes participate in the formation of visual mental
images, along with visual areas. Furthermore, the left middle frontal gyrus and the parietal
lobes seem to be involved in the reality-monitoring process that allows those visual mental
images to be distinguished from perception. The study of patients with clinical hallucinations,
such as schizophrenia and Parkinson’s disease patients, would enable us to investigate whether
the same brain structures are involved in visual hallucinations. Further, analogous procedures
involving verbal, rather than visual, material would enable us to determine whether the confu-
sion between inner speech and perceived voices in patients with verbal hallucinations is simi-
larly subserved by a fronto-parietal cortical network.
Supporting Information
S1 Fig. Brain activity for each trial type during the encoding phase. Common brain activity
observed in 25 participants during encoding, after controlling for sex and verbal IQ. Rows
illustrate the four trial types: presented words later remembered as words (WW), presented
words later remembered as pictures (WP), presented pictures later remembered as pictures
(PP), and presented pictures later remembered as words (PW). A FWE-corrected voxel-level
p< 0.05 was applied.
(TIF)
S2 Fig. Brain activity for each trial type during the recall phase. Common brain activity
observed in 24 participants during recall, after controlling for sex and verbal IQ. Rows illus-
trate the four trial types: presented words remembered as words (WW), presented words
remembered as pictures (WP), presented pictures remembered as pictures (PP), and presented
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pictures remembered as words (PW). A FWE-corrected cluster-level p< 0.05 was applied
after an uncorrected voxel-level p< 0.0003 (T = 4).
(TIF)
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